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THE RELEVANCE OF THE CHINESE EXPERIENCE FOR 
T H I R D  W O R L D  ECONOMIC D E V E L O P M E N T  
THOMAS E. WEISSKOPF 
Since the mid-1970s the People's Republic of China has entered into a 
transitional phase of political and economic uncertainty, following its 
first quarter-century of development under the leadership of Mao 
Ze-dong. Statements and actions by the post-Mao political leadership 
point to the possibility that the social and economic policies characteristic 
of the first 25 years of the People's Republic may be considerably altered 
in the years to come. While it is surely too early to assess the scope of the 
changes that will characterize the post-Mao period, it is now appropriate 
to look back and assess the Chinese development experience under Mao. 
This development experience has attracted a great deal of attention, 
especially from people elsewhere in the third world, as reports of China's 
substantial development achievements have contrasted with evidence of 
development failures in many other third world countries. Although Chi- 
na's current leaders tend to emphasize the backwardness of the Chinese 
economy relative to the rich industrialized economies of the West, Chi- 
na's economic progress since the triumph of the Communist Revolution in 
1949 has generated much interest in the Maoist approach as a potential 
model for third world economic development. It is clear that the Chinese 
experience has been in many ways a unique one, from which other soci- 
eties may have much to learn. 
In this paper I will seek to determine the extent to which lessons can be 
drawn from the Chinese experience under Mao by people concerned with 
the prospects for economic development in the rest of the third world. 
My perspective will be very broad; I will focus on the basic institutions 
and elements of economic strategy which have distinguished the Chinese 
development model sharply from that of most other countries. Thus my 
discussion will be directed to people in a position to consider broad 
alternative approaches to development, whether they be academic scho- 
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lars or participants in movements for social, political, and economic 
change in the third world. I will begin with a brief review and discussion 
of some of China's major development achievements in the quarter-cen- 
tury following the Revolution. Next, I will identify ten lessons in develop- 
ment strategy that are suggested by the Chinese experience, following 
which l will analyze the extent to which the applicability of these lessons 
is linked to conditions obtaining in the People' Republic of China, focus 
on the importance of the political-economic system, and consider the 
geographical and historical setting. Finally, I will conclude with some 
observations about the transferability of lessons from the Chinese experi- 
ence to other parts of the third world. 
China's Achievements in Economic Development 
There was a time when a nation's performance in economic development 
was measured exclusively by the rate of growth of its per capita output. 
However, the experience of poor countries in recent decades has led to 
increasing doubt about the facile identification of economic development 
with economic growth. On the one hand, political leaders in many of these 
countries have explicitly proclaimed development objectives other than 
rapid economic growth, such as greater equity and national self-reliance. 
On the other hand, it has become evident that there are a variety of ways 
of promoting economic growth, each with different consequences for other 
aspects of economic development. To measure China's achievements in 
economic development, it is therefore important to consider the progress 
made with respect to several relevant development objectives. 
Both the political rhetoric ancl the academic literature on economic devel- 
opment suggest that four broad objectives are especially compelling: 
faster economic growth, greater economic equity, higher rates of employ- 
ment, and a greater degree of economic self-reliance. Each of these objec- 
tives in turn comprises a number of related sub-objectives, so that there 
exists a variety of possible performance indicators with which to measure 
progress over time. In spite of continuing difficulties in obtaining reliable 
statistical information, there is now sufficient evidence available to docu- 
ment reasonably accurately China's performance with respect to the four 
major development objectives. 
Economic Growth. l Most estimates of the average annual rate of growth 
of total real output from the early 1950s to the mid-1970s are close to 6%, 
with a corresponding rate of growth of per capita output of approxi- 
mately 4%. Industrial output has grown especially rapidly: the estimates 
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suggest a minimum of 10% per year. Agricultural output has grown more 
slowly, but it has outpaced the growth of population (roughly 2% per year) 
and may have reached an average of 3% for the period as a whole. 
Although the share of total output devoted to investment has risen to an 
unusually high level (estimated at more than 25%), the average rate of 
growth of per capita consumption grew at an annual rate of at least 3% 
from 1950 to 1975. These growth figures are considerably higher than 
average for the third world as a whole, but there are some non-socialist 
countries that have shown more rapid economic growth (e.g., Taiwan, 
South Korea, Iran, Mexico)2 
Economic  EquiO'. ~ China's achievements in economic equity have con- 
trasted dramatically with the experience of many other third world coun- 
tries. First, the evidence suggests that the Chinese have succeeded in pro- 
viding for virtually everyone the security of a modest but adequate 
minimum standard of living, including the basic necessities of food, shel- 
ter, and clothing, as well as access to health care and education. Second, 
the Chinese have completely elimimated the huge individual and family 
fortunes that in the non-socialist world permit a small elite to enjoy 
luxurious patterns of consumption out of all proportion to the national 
average standard of living. To be sure, there remain considerable inequa- 
lities of income in contemporary China; but the Chinese have avoided the 
pattern of sharply increasing inequality that has most often accompanied 
the process of early industrialization in developing countries. Moreover, 
by the universal provision of certain benefits, by the subsidization and/or  
rationing of many necessities, and by a strong social taboo on ostenta- 
tious consumption, the Chinese have greatly mitigated the differentiating 
consequences of unequally distributed incomes for personal life styles and 
consumption patterns. The Chinese have also done very well with respect 
to other dimensions of economic equity. Urban/rural  differentials and 
inter-regional disparities in levels of living have not been allowed to 
increase (as they have in almost every other developing country), and 
they may even have been reduced by centralized macroeconomic policies 
designed to redistribute resources and income from urban to rural areas 
and from richer to poorer regions. At the level of the individual enterprise 
(rural or urban, agricultural or non-agricultural), the Chinese have signif- 
icantly reduced the high degree of economic and social stratification inher- 
ited from pre-Revolutionay China. Real differentials in remuneration 
are much narrower in China than almost anywhere else in the modern 
world, and the status distinction between workers and managers was 
systematically de-emphasized during Mao's lifetime. 
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Employment .  4 Although there appears to be a considerable amount of 
underemployment (i.e., relatively unproductive employment) in China as 
in other labor-abundant countries of the third world, the evidence sug- 
gests that there has been very little overt unemployment. Not only has 
virtually every able-bodied man been provided with some kind of job, but 
growing numbers of women have entered the active labor force. China's 
ability to employ the bulk of the population of working age stands in 
stark contrast to the experience of every non-socialist country in the third 
world, where a significant fraction of the potential labor force is involun- 
tarily idle. 
Economic  Self-Reliance.  5 The objective of economic self-reliance is a 
broad one that includes two different but related dimensions. First, it 
entails the notion of economic self-sufficiency, which can be promoted by 
developing a diversified structure of productive capacity that minimizes 
dependence on goods and services imported from outside the economy in 
question. Second, it entails the notion of economic autonomy, which can 
be promoted by establishing indigenous control over economic activities 
and minimizing reliance on (or indebtedness to) people and institutions 
from outside the economy. Economic self-reliance, in the sense of self- 
sufficiency as well as autonomy, has been promoted as an objective at the 
national level as well as at the regional and local level. 
China has achieved an overall degree of national self-reliance unparal- 
leled in the third world. China's achievements in national self-sufficiency 
have been substantial but not unique. The Chinese economy produces a 
great diversity of agricultural and industrial products, including many 
kinds of capital goods; however, China remains dependent on imported 
goods and technology for relatively advanced types of industrial activity 
(e.g., aircraft manufacturing). China's achievements in national autonomy 
have been especially impressive. Economic activity is entirely under 
Chinese control; China has maintained a generally favorable balance of 
trade, has remained free of any major foreign indebtedness, and has been 
relatively independent of foreign financial and technical assistance, 
especially since the break with the Soviet Union in 1960. In addition to its 
degree of national self-reliance, China has made considerable progress in 
promoting regional and local self-reliance. Industrial activity in general 
has been dispersed around the country, and small-scale industries in 
particular - serving local markets and oriented primarily to nearby 
agricultural activities - have been established in large numbers in many 
rural areas. It is harder to measure the extent to which regions and 
localities have gained in economic autonomy, but most productive 
activities are managed by regional and local authorities. 
287 
Viewed as a whole, the most striking feature of China's economic devel- 
opment performance in the first quarter-century since the Revolution is 
that the achievement of a very satisfactory rate of overall economic 
growth was combined with impressive progress with respect to several 
other significant objectives of economic development. China's was not 
the fastest-growing economy in the third world, but China was surely the 
nation with the most balanced pattern of economic development. The 
Chinese experience proves decisively that the achievement of rapid eco- 
nomic growth need not necessarily preclude the attainment of other devel- 
opment objectives such as full employment and a high degree of equity 
and self-reliance. This important proposition runs counter to the experi- 
ence of those third world countries that have grown rapidly in the postwar 
period along capitalist lines. In every capitalist "success story" the distri- 
bution of income, wealth, and power remains highly unequal; problems 
of unemployment abound, and the role of foreigners in the economic 
growth process remains a very important one. 6 Only in China (and per- 
haps to a lesser extent in North Korea and North Vietnam) has it been 
demonstrated that substantial economic growth can be achieved in an 
egalitarian social and economic environment in which employment is 
assured and in which both national and local self-reliance is significantly 
enhanced. 
Establishing the possibility of rapid economic growth and the simulta- 
neous achievement of other development objectives does not prove it can 
become an actuality everywhere else in the third world. Even so, the 
Chinese experience is significant because it demonstrates the potential of 
a radical socialist alternative to capitalist development and thereby sets 
new and higher standards for the goals of economic development. The 
Chinese example makes it difficult for anyone to argue convincingly that 
a "trickle-down" capitalist model of development, which ignores or defers 
consideration of equity, employment, and self-reliance, is the only or best 
way to promote economic progress. In recent years there has in fact been 
a marked shift in emphasis toward non-growth development objectives in 
the rhetoric (and, to a much lesser extent, in the actions) of many third 
world political leaders and first world development agencies. This shift is 
partly attributable to social and political tensions arising from the pursuit 
of purely growth-oriented capitalist development strategies, but it has 
undoubtedly been reinforced by the evidence of progress in China toward 
a multiplicity of development objectives. China's progress under Mao has 
also stimulated interest in possible lessons for other third world countries 
from the Chinese development experience. This possibility will be ex- 
amined in the following sections. 7 
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Lessons From the Chinese Strategy of Development 
I have asserted that the most significant implication of China's develop- 
ment performance is that the achievement of rapid economic growth can 
be combined with significant progress toward several other relevant devel- 
opment objectives. It follows that the strategy of economic development 
pursued in China should offer object lessons about the means by which this 
achievement can be obtained. My purpose here is to identify key elements 
of the Chinese development strategy. It has evolved over time, and there 
have been frequent modifications of economic policy since 1949. In consid- 
ering the strategy here, I will confine myself to ten fundamental ele- 
ments which were introduced and pursued (with varying degrees of com- 
mitment) under Mao's leadership from 1949 to 1976. 8 In each case I will 
describe briefly the element of strategy and then discuss how it can contrib- 
ute to the simultaneous promotion of economic growth and one or more 
other development objectives. 9 
1. Promotion o f  Collective Institutions and Behavior Patterns. A distinc- 
tive element in the Chinese strategy of development under Mao was the 
priority given to institutional and behavioral change in general, and the 
promotion of collective institutions and behavior patterns in particular. 
Collective institutions bring people together into a context of shared 
experience, cooperative effort, and participatory control; they imply a 
degree of equality in status and decentralization of authority that goes 
well beyond the replacement of private with public ownership and man- 
agement. The drive toward collective institutional forms was strongest in 
rural areas, where the progressive transformation of agrarian society 
from one based on private land-holdings to one based on collective pro- 
duction brigades and production teams preceded major efforts to revolu- 
tionize techniques of agricultural production. But also in urban areas, 
many enterprises and neighborhoods were reorganized along more col- 
lective lines. The development of collective institutions was accompanied 
by the inculcation of collective values through the educational system, the 
media, etc., in a deliberate effort to change the way people think and act 
so as to promote more cooperative and less antagonistic patterns of 
behavior. 
An important aspect of the Chinese promotion of collective institutions 
and behavior patterns was the effort to depart from conventional elitist 
modes of decision-making within production units by encouraging mass 
participation in the decision-making process. In any organization - wheth- 
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er private or public - there is a tendency for those at the top of the 
administrative hierarchy, and/or  those with the greatest expertise, to 
dominate in making decisions. Often this tendency is explicitly sanc- 
tioned by an authoritarian form of organizational control that relegates 
most people to a position of taking orders from above. But the Chinese 
tried to counter this elitist model by stressing the right of every peasant or 
worker in a production unit to participate in the decision-making process 
and by arranging for mass involvement in policy discussion. Whatever 
the actual influence of individual peasants or workers on the decisions 
that are ultimately made, there is little doubt that they derived a genuine 
sense of involvement and identification with the production unit that is 
conspicuously lacking in the conventional elitist model. 
The emphasis on institutional and behavioral change along collective 
lines can contribute to greater productivity (and hence to faster economic 
growth) in several ways. Institutions that encourage or permit a privi- 
leged few to dominate the great majority have long been recognized as 
major obstacles to the diffusion of improved methods of production and 
to the growth of worker productivity. Systematic efforts to introduce new 
institutions and inculcate new patterns of behavior that stress coopera- 
tion in productive activity and the sharing of its fruits can encourage 
greater receptiveness to new technology and greater work effort in 
general. Widespread participation in decision-making is likely to enhance 
the productivity of an enterprise because all of its workers (rather than 
just a few top executives) have an incentive and an opportunity to develop 
an understanding of the operation of the enterprise as a whole and to 
make decisions about its improvement. Even more important, worker 
morale and productivity are bound to be higher when participation in 
decision-making leads to strong identification with the enterprise rather 
than continual antagonism toward bosses. ~0 
At the same time, the promotion of collective institutions in general - and 
worker participation in decision-making in particular - can contribute to 
greater equity at both the national and the enterprise level. The elimina- 
tion of private ownership of land and other means of production removes 
a major source of inequity in the national distribution of income. More- 
over, the promotion of collective ideals and cooperative behavior can 
succeed only in an environment in which the distribution of the fruits of 
productive activity is reasonably equitable. Mass participation in deci- 
sion-making contributes to equity at the enterprise level by reducing 
differentials in status and power that tend to result in corresponding 
differentials in income as well. Finally, the promotion of collective insti- 
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tutions serves the objective of local self-reliance insofar as it tends to 
reduce the degree of control by central authorities and to provide more 
autonomy to local collectivities. 
2. Maximization of  Productive Labor Input. Like many other third 
world nations, China began its modern development effort with a relative- 
ly abundant supply of labor and chronic problems of unemployment. To 
assure maximum use of the potentially available labor force under such 
circumstances, it is necessary both to generate sufficient opportunities for 
productive employment (to raise the demand for labor) and to find ways 
of increasing the hours that people have available for work (to raise the 
supply of labor). In most poor nations the demand for labor has remain- 
ed well below the level needed to employ everyone even without any 
increase in labor supply. But the Chinese succeeded in developing institu- 
tional arrangements to ensure that virtually every adult capable of work- 
ing is indeed engaged on a full-time basis in some form of productive 
work activity. 
Public authorities in China took responsibility for providing jobs to ev- 
eryone able to work, who was in turn obligated to work full-time at the job 
to which he/she was assigned. The generation of sufficient employment 
opportunities in a labor-abundant society was achieved by systematic 
efforts to promote labor-using activities and techniques of production. 
On the one hand, small-scale and labor-intensive industries and service 
activities were promoted to complement the basic necessary large-scale 
and capital-intensive industries (this is known as the policy of "walking 
on two legs"). On the other hand, a great variety of labor-intensive public 
works projects were organized to employ labor at times and in places 
where regular employment opportunities are limited (e.g., by the seasonal 
nature of many agricultural activities). Indeed, the ingenuity and determi- 
nation of Chinese authorities to generate work opportunities actually 
turned an abundance of labor into a shortage of labor in many areas. 
While raising the demand for labor, the Chinese sought to increase the 
available supply of labor in a variety of ways. Small-scale industrial and 
service activities were dispersed to neighborhoods and communities 
where they would be more accessible to workers whose mobility is limited 
(e.g., by children); child-care centers were established to permit both 
parents to work simultaneously; certain kinds of productive work were 
performed by children as part of their school curriculum; and vacation 
time was limited by comparison with most other societies. In addition, 
periodic mass campaigns engaged large numbers of people in more or less 
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voluntary extra work on collective tasks. This strategy of exhaustive 
labor mobilization obviously and directly serves to achieve the objective 
of full employment. In a labor-abundant economy, it also makes an 
important contribution to economic growth by assuring full utilization of 
an abundant resource. To be sure, some of the labor thus mobilized is 
utilized in relatively unproductive ways and might more appropriately be 
considered "underemployed" than fully employed. But this observation 
does not detract from the fact that every person enjoys the dignity of a 
full-time job. Nor does it alter the fact that every person is making some 
positive contribution to the national product; since everyone's basic sub- 
sistence requirements must be met somehow out of that national product, 
whether or not they are making any productive contribution, the fact that 
some people may in some sense be contributing less than they consume is 
immaterial. 
3. Alternative Means of Work Motivation. The Chinese determination to 
maximize the quantity of labor done was complemented by vigorous 
efforts to stimulate greater effort and creativity on the part of the work- 
ers, based on the premise that wide variations are possible in the quality 
of work done by workers. It follows that motivating a worker to perform to 
his/her full potential can lead to great gains in overall productivity. 1~ 
The conventional means of work motivation in developed or developing 
economies is based primarily on individual material gain incentives, in 
the form of higher wages, bonuses, or profits. The Chinese strategy was 
not to eliminate such incentives entirely, but to de-emphasize them and to 
rely to a varying extent on other kinds of incentive systems. Differential 
wages were paid for work of different quantity and quality, but wage 
differentials were kept within a relatively narrow range. Wherever pos- 
sible, collective rather than individual material gain incentives were stress- 
ed, so that the return for greater work effort would be realized in mater- 
ial gains for an entire production brigade, commune, factory, or neighbor- 
hood. And non-material incentives, involving appeals to social conscience 
and pride combined with strong group pressure, were an important 
element in the overall Chinese approach to work motivation. These were 
based on  continuing politicization of the people by Party leaders and 
cadres as well as by periodic ideological campaigns to spur the 
accomplishment of specific tasks. 
Reliance on multiple modes of work motivation, with flexibility to vary 
the relative emphasis on alternative modes over time, contributes to eco- 
nomic growth by sustaining higher levels of work effort than would be 
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possible using only individual material gain incentives. Beyond effort 
alone, creativity and leadership at work seem more likely to be stimulated 
by collective and non-material incentives than by individual material gain 
incentives, because it is generally difficult to structure the latter in such a 
way as to reward directly the creative or exemplary worker. Finally, the 
downgrading of individual material gain incentives permits economic 
growth to proceed in a context of greater equity in the distribution of 
income because differentials in labor income can be considerably nar- 
rowed when they are no longer the primary basis for motivating work 
effort. 
4. Mass-oriented Human Resource Development. A distinctive element 
in the Chinese approach to improving labor quality (or "investing in 
human capital") 12 was the emphasis on distributing a modest amount of 
relevsnt skills to each of many people rather than concentrating a great 
amount of skills on a limited number of people. This was clearly manifest- 
ed in the health field, where the Chinese devoted much of their resources 
to the training of para-professionals rather than professional experts. But 
it permeated many other fields as well - education, industry, agriculture, 
etc. - in a systematic effort to limit dependence on experts (and the power 
accruing to those experts). There are obvious limits to this approach, and 
there are consequently highly specialized and expert scientists, engineers, 
and doctors in China. But over a considerable range of choice the Chi- 
nese moved much further away from an elitist pattern of human resource 
development than most other societies. Such a mass-oriented human 
resource strategy is economically more rational (and in that sense more 
conductive to economic growth) than an elite-oriented approach in a 
poor society where skills are scarce in supply, both because the costs of 
imparting skills tend to be lower and the opportunities to apply the skills 
tend to be greater the less specialized the skills in question. At the same 
time, this strategy promotes equity both by distributing sources of person- 
al power and prestige more equally among the population and by contri- 
buting to more widespread access to important social services provided 
by skilled personnel (such as health care and education). 
5. Universal Guarantee of  Material Security. The Chinese public authori- 
ties consistently took responsibility for guaranteeing a minimum level of 
material security to everyone in the society. Whatever an individual's 
ability to work or performance at work, he/she was able to count on 
receiving the basic necessities of life - sufficient food, clothing, and shel- 
ter to sustain a modest but essentially healthy standard of living. The real 
income floor thus guaranteed was gradually improved over time in quan- 
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tity and quality, until it included at least some basic health care and 
access to primary education for everyone. The Chinese people thus 
enjoyed a form of comprehensive social insurance that relieved them of 
the threat of catastrophic economic loss. 
The guarantee of material security contributes in several ways to the pace 
of economic growth. First, it contributes to the success of family planning 
efforts which (especially in a labor-abundant economy) are likely to 
reduce the rate of population growth more than the rate of output 
growth, thereby accelerating the growth of per capita output. A major 
obstacle to the success of family planning programs in many poor coun- 
tries has been the desire of parents to have additional children as a form 
of insurance against economic insecurity. ~3 The guarantee of material 
security eliminates this obstacle, and the organizational apparatus neces- 
sary to provide minimal levels of health care and other basic services to 
everyone serves as an ideal mechanism for promoting birth control prac- 
tices. 
Second, the assurance of a minimum real standard of living for all contri- 
butes to the growth of output by improving the productivity of those 
classes of workers who would otherwise be below that minimum.14 Up to 
levels that are enjoyed by most workers only in affluent societies, worker 
productivity is clearly a positive function of the level of nutrition, health,. 
and education of the worker. Where every able-bodied person has the 
opportunity and the duty to work, public expenditures necessary to guar- 
antee adequate real incomes and basic social services for people other- 
wise deprived of them assume the form of "human capital" investment; 
they contribute to enhanced output by increasing the quality of employed 
labor. 
Third, the guarantee of material security contributes to a social climate in 
which people are more likely to identify their own interests with the 
interest of the larger collective societal unit that is the source of the 
guarantee. Under these circumstances, collective material incentives and 
moral incentives based on an appeal to pride in the society as a whole are 
more likely to be successful in motivating greater work effort. Moreover, 
the responsibility of public authorities to provide a minimum standard of 
living for every person irrespective of their work generates a strong incen- 
tive for those authorities to find productive work for everyone, even 
though this may mean that some add less to output by producing than 
they substract by consuming (as is often the case in poor and labor- 
abundant economies). ~5 Apart from its various potential contributions to 
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economic growth, the universal guarantee of material security contrib- 
utes directly to a more equitable distribution of national income. 
6. Restriction of  Luxury Consumption. Just as the Chinese set a lower 
limit on people's living standards by guaranteeing a minimum level of 
material security, so they imposed an upper limit by restricting luxury 
consumption. This restriction was accomplished partly by limiting the 
maximum level of individual incomes and partly by limiting the availabil- 
ity of luxury consumption goods and services. The domestic consumer 
good sector was heavily oriented to the production of necessities; the few 
luxury items actually produced were destined primarily for export (or for 
visiting foreigners). Similarly, the import of luxury goods was virtually 
banned. General tolerance of such consumption limitations was fostered 
by the minimization of contact with more affluent life styles in foreign 
countrieL 
The restriction of luxury consumption can contribute to economic 
growth in two ways. First, it can facilitate a higher rate of investment and 
more rapid new capital formation, for resources that might otherwise be 
devoted to luxury goods production are instead available for the produc- 
tion of capital goods. Second, it may increase the net availability of 
scarce resources such as capital equipment and foreign exchange, for 
many luxury goods are relatively capital- and import-intensive as com- 
pared with other consumption or investment goods. 16 Finally, like the 
universal guarantee of material security, the restriction of luxury con- 
sumption contributes directly to the objective of equity in the national 
distribution of economic well-being. But, in addition, it contributes sig- 
nificantly to economic equity at the enterprise level by reducing differen- 
ces in life styles among workers at different levels of authority and 
income. 
7. Reduction of  the Social Division of  Labor. Economic organization in 
most modern societies fosters a high degree of specialization by task; 
indeed, the more differentiated the occupational structure of a society's 
labor force, the more advanced its economy is likely to be considered. In 
this respect, too, the Chinese experience under Mao was distinctive in its 
periodic concern with encouraging individual workers to engage in a 
variety of different kinds of tasks rather than develop systematically only 
one kind of specialized competence. Thus the Chinese required many 
"mental" workers to undertake manual labor for various periods of time, 
they sought to include the experience of manual labor with the acquisi- 
tion of cognitive skills in the educational system, and they encouraged 
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manual workers and peasants to participate in managerial decision-mak- 
ing. All of this can be described as an attempt to reduce the social division 
of labor as opposed to the technical division of labor, for it seeks not to 
counter the technical division of production processes into many separat- 
ely performed sub-tasks but to counter the social allocation of a single 
kind of productive role to each person throughout his/her productive 
life. 
The division of labor has long been regarded as the most important basis 
for advances in productivity. However, the productivity gains to be reap- 
ed from the specialization of tasks - the technical division of labor - do 
not always require the continual specialization of individuals to tasks - 
the social division of labor. In cases where long and arduous training is 
required to master a particular kind of task (e.g., advanced medical 
practice), it would undoubtedly be wasteful to rotate people in and out of 
the occupation for limited amounts of time. But in many instances where 
the requisite training is more easily acquired, the efficiency losses associat- 
ed with occupational turnover could well be more than offset by produc- 
tivity gains from several other sources. These include greater alertness due 
to the reduced monotony of work, more innovative ideas because of 
greater variety in the past experiences and perspectives of workers, and 
better communication and understanding among workers engaged in 
different tasks, because of a larger degree of shared background and 
experience. Thus, efforts to reduce the social division of labor may in 
many instances pay off in terms of greater productivity and more rapid 
economic growth. At the same time, they contribute to greater equity 
both at the enterprise and national level: they tend to equalize status, 
prestige, and power among different kinds of workers in any given work 
setting, and they encourage a more equal overall distribution of income 
and power by distributing skills and roles more evenly across the whole 
population. 
8. Economic Diversification of  Regions and Localities. Just as the Chi- 
nese sought to reduce occupational specialization, thereby enabling peo- 
ple to become more diversified in experience, so they sought to reduce the 
economic specialization of geographical areas, thereby enabling regions 
and localities to become more diversified in economic capacity. This 
strategy of economic diversification was carried out at several levels. 
First, it included spreading new units of major industries into many 
different provinces rather than concentrating all units in a few initial or 
most favorable sites. Second, it included the establishment of small-scale 
industrial enterprises in towns and rural areas throughout the country, as 
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part of a concerted effort at rural industrialization. Third, it involved a 
systematic attempt at the commune level to integrate agricultural produc- 
tion with related industrial development activities - production and 
repair of agricultural implements, processing of agricultural products, 
and construction of roads and water works. 
All such policies of economic diversification clearly serve the develop- 
ment objective of promoting greater economic self-reliance at the region- 
al and local levels, Insofar as they involve geographic dispersal rather 
than concentration of key industries, they also contribute to greater 
equity among regions. More controversial is the contention that the eco- 
nomic diversification of regions and localities serves the objective of 
promoting more rapid economic growth, for it runs counter to the (neo- 
classical) economic logic of specialization by comparative advantage. Yet 
there are certain important benefits attributable to the spread of industry 
to rural areas and/or  to small-scale establishments which may outweigh 
any costs associated with less-than-optimal sites for plants or scales of 
production. ~7 In the first place, rural and small-scale industrialization 
helps to develop the technical skills and know-how of much larger numb- 
ers of people than would be possible when industry is concentrated in 
urban areas and large units. Equally significant, a decentralized structure 
of industry permits much greater flexibility in adapting to local resource 
supply conditions. In particular, small-scale and/or  rural industry is like- 
ly to be more compatible with the relatively labor-intensive and capital- 
saving techniques of production that are most appropriate for poor and 
labor-abundant economies. Finally, foregone economies of large-scale 
production may be offset by lowered costs of transport and distribution. 
9. Rural-Urban Balance. One of the most persistent patterns characteriz- 
ing the development experience of third world nations is a marked pro- 
urban bias. This bias is reflected in many spheres: allocation of develop- 
ment expenditures, distribution of medical and educational facilities, and 
policies affecting the terms of trade between rural and urban products. 
Consequently, urban real incomes tend to be higher and to grow faster 
than rural real incomes, and there is a great deal of migration from rural 
to urban areas which often results primarily in a growing pool of urban 
unemployment. After experiencing similar tendencies in the early period 
of their planned development, the Chinese undertook deliberately and 
successfully to stem the pro-urban tide and to promote a balance between 
rural and urban areas. This required not merely increases in the alloca- 
tions of public expenditure to rural areas and improvements in the terms 
of trade for agricultural goods, but also several more strongly interven- 
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tionist policies: strict control of migration patterns so as to reverse the 
typical urban influx, the hsia-fang program of assigning urban school 
graduates to work for varying periods of time in rural areas, and the 
promotion of rural industrialization to bring jobs to the peasantry. Thus' 
the usual pattern of cumulative imbalance between rural and urban areas 
was broken at several points. 
The pro-urban bias in most third world nations has been criticized for its 
inefficiency as well as its inequity.~8 It is inefficient because it leads to the 
use of resources in urban areas which could be more productively used in 
rural areas, and it is inequitable because it favors urban over rural resi- 
dents and often (as a consequence) richer over poorer people. By over- 
coming the conventional bias, the Chinese would appear to have reaped 
benefits both with respect to economic growth and with respect to nation- 
al and regional economic equity. Moreover, by promoting the flow of 
resources, skilled personnel, and productive activities from urban to rural 
areas, the Chinese have also encouraged the growth of local self-reliance. 
10. Limitation of the Role of Foreigners. The Chinese under Mao's lead- 
ership restricted sharply foreign involvement in the domestic economy 
as well as contact between the indigenous people and foreigners. Foreign 
trade was limited to critical imported commodities, and every effort was 
made to develop a domestic capacity to produce as wide a range of 
needed products as possible. Foreign ownership of productive assets was 
prohibited, foreign loans were sought in limited amounts and repaid as 
quickly as possible, foreign technical assistance was welcomed only when 
it was indispensible and contributed to the development of indigenous 
capacitie s , and foreigners were prevented from using their financial or 
technical inputs to develop bases of continuing economic power. Soviet 
financial and technical assistance played a critical role in Chinese 
industrial development in the first decade following the Revolution, but 
thereafter China did without significant external assistance from any 
source. At the same time, the Chinese people were kept isolated from the 
outside world by a virtual ban on foreign travel and strict limitation and 
regulation of visitors and communications from abroad. 
This careful restriction of foreign involvement in the economy has 
obviously contributed to the achievement of greater self-reliance at the 
national level, both in economic self-sufficiency and national autonomy. 
It has encouraged the development of indigenous Chinese skills, re- 
sources, and technology, and has prevented foreign nations, agencies, or 
corporations from gaining significant economic power in China. Arguably, 
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China might have been able to generate a more rapid rate of economic 
growth, at least in the short-run, by encouraging more foreign trade and 
seeking more foreign aid, loans, and technical assistance. But the Chinese 
experience suggests that vigorous determination to "do it yourself '  by 
substituting indigenous initiative for foreign inputs can lead to an 
expansion and - even more important a diversification of indigenous 
resources which gives the economy a greater adaptability to changing 
economic needs and to promote long-run economic growth. The 
advantages of self-reliance for long-run growth are especially important 
for technological ability, for it is well recognized that the kinds of 
technology appropriate for a poor (and especially a labor-abundant) 
economy are often very different than the technology available from 
foreign sources. ~9 
The Political-Economic Basis of the Chinese Strategy of Development 
The various elements of the Chinese strategy of development previously 
discussed were carried out in the context of the particular political-econo- 
mic system introduced into China following the revolutionary triumph of 
the Chinese Communist Party in 1949. In assessing the relevance of the 
Chinese experience for other third world nations, one must first analyze 
the extent to which the Chinese strategy was linked to China's underlying 
political-economic system and the extent to which elements of that strat- 
egy could be pursued under different political-economic conditions. A 
political-economic system can be broadly characterized in terms of its 
basic economic institutions, the nature and strength of its state, and its 
class structure. Without trying to include all of the distinctive characteris- 
tics of the Chinese system, one can identify several essential features that 
can be shown to have contributed in one way or another to the successful 
implementation of the Chinese strategy of development. 20 
Two basic economic institutions were central to the Chinese political-eco- 
nomic system. First, there was predominantly public ownership and con- 
trol of the means of production. Public control in China was exercised at 
a variety of levels and in a variety of forms, ranging from central govern- 
ment control of certain major industries to provincial, county, and 
municipal control of many smaller-scale industries to communal and 
sub-communal control of most agricultural activities; there was also coop- 
erative control of some small services. Second, there was widespread 
administrative control of resource allocation. To a substantial degree 
(which has varied over time) the Chinese rejected the use of market-based 
prices and substituted administrative processes for allocating resources - 
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notably in labor markets, markets for raw materials and intermediate 
goods, and markets for certain basic consumer goods. The necessary 
planning process was relatively decentralized, with administrative control 
exercised at many different levels of government. 
The state - or governmental apparatus in the Chinese political-economic 
system provided the national political leadership with great authority. 
First, the central government had the power to mobilize resources on a 
large scale for purposes determined by the national leadership. Through 
direct control of certain major public enterprises and its ability to tax 
other enterprises and activities, the central government acquired the pur- 
chasing power needed for substantial public expenditures; moreover, the 
leadership indirectly shaped the pattern of resource mobilization and 
expenditure at lower levels of government. Second, the Chinese system 
included an effective and extensive structure o f  public administration, 
which ensured that basic policy decisions of the national political leader- 
ship were carried out throughout the country and not frustrated at lower 
levels. This administrative structure involved not only the various levels of 
civilian government, but also (for various purposes) the army and the 
Communist Party. Moreover, it did not rely heavily on direct centralized 
control but instead permitted substantial lower-level operational autonomy 
in achieving goals established at the top. Third, a distinctive source 
of leadership authority in China was the ability to influence and 
involve people throughout the country in a profound way. This ability 
was attributable to several factors: the existence of an experienced and 
disciplined Communist Party organization, whose numerous cadres 
retained close ties with the masses; tight central control of educational 
institutions and the communications media; and the systematic develop- 
ment and dissemination of a purposeful ideology. 
The class structure that has characterized China since the Revolution is 
complex and in many ways continuously evolving. Obviously the pre- 
capitalist and capitalist elites of the ancien regime - landlords, warlords, 
merchants, businessmen, etc. - ceased to play a significant role. In their 
stead, peasants, workers, soldiers, Party cadres and government officials 
occupied the stage. There is clearly a sense in which the Communist Party 
leadership can be considered an elite class in the People's Republic, since 
it occupies a position of great presitge and power. What is most relevant 
to the present analysis, however, is which class or classes can most suc- 
cessfully assure favorable consideration from the political leadership - 
whether it be because of the social origin, the historical background, the 
need for ideological legitimacy, or any other characteristic of the leaders. 
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In other words, the class orientation of the political leadership reflects in 
a significant way the underlying class structure of the Chinese political- 
economic system. 
Two main features of the class orientation of China's political leadership 
during Mao's lifetime stand out as particularly distinctive and important. 
First, the Chinese leaderhsip was strongly mass-oriented, as opposed to 
elite-oriented. For historical and ideological reasons, the Chinese Com- 
munist Party maintained a real commitment to the masses - poor peas- 
ants and workers - rather than orienting itself mainly to the interest of 
the elites - managers and intellectuals. Thus, significantly, the poor were 
in command iff China. Second, the Chinese leadership was relatively 
rural-oriented rather than urban-oriented. The historical roots of the 
revolutionary success of the Chinese Communist Party, and the social 
origin of most Party members, were in the rural areas of the country; as a 
consequence, rural classes in general, and the peasants in particular, 
occupied an influential position in the overall class structure. 
The political-economic system that was established in revolutionary 
China contrasts sharply with systems existing in most other nations of the 
third world. 2~ Some of these nations share one or more of the seven 
distinctive features of the Chinese system underlined in the preceding 
paragraphs, but very few share them all. Most contemporary third world 
nations are characterized by widespread private ownership of the means 
of production, considerable use of market price mechanisms for resource 
allocation, relatively weak structures of government authority, and class 
structures dominated by a mixture of pre-capitalist and capitalist elites. 
To investigate the extent to which lessons from the Chinese strategy of 
development might be applicable to nations with different political- 
economic characteristics, I will consider in turn each of the ten major 
elements of the Chinese strategy and attempt to determine which of the 
distinctive features of the Chinese political-economic system were essen- 
tial for their successful implementation. 
The promotion of collective institutions and behavior patterns clearly 
presupposed the establishment of public ownership of the means of 
production, for private ownership implies control from the top and 
separates sharply the role of managers and workers. Public ownership is 
a necessary but by no means sufficient condition for the establishment of 
collective forms of work organization; indeed, most public enterprises in 
both capitalist and socialist economies are operated along conventionally 
authoritarian lines. To ensure that public enterprises are not dominated by 
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bureaucratic managers and professional experts, it is also necessary that 
the class structure be oriented to the masses rather than to the elites. The 
ability of the Chinese to make a success of the major institutional and 
behavioral transformation involved in promoting collectivization clearly 
also depended on the strength of the Chinese state. In particular, an 
effective and extensive system of public administration would appear to 
be indispensable for thoroughgoing institutional reorganization, and the 
ability to reach, influence, and involve people on a large scale would seem 
essential for developing new patterns of behavior appropriate to the new 
institutions. The importance of involving people at the local level cannot 
be overstated, for unless the masses are sufficiently motivated it is all too 
easy for institutional change to be subverted by sullen hostility or uncoop- 
erative behavior. 
The maxim&ation of  productive labor input was also dependent for its 
success on several major features of China's political-economic system. To 
raise the demand for labor the Chinese relied on administrative control of 
the allocation of labor as well as public control of most productive activi- 
ties. These two basic economic institutions are not, however, indispens- 
able for the purpose of promoting full employment. Profit-maximizing 
capitalists operating in a free labor market would surely not employ 
everyone in a labor-abundant economy where full employment would 
reduce the marginal contribution of labor to output well below a min- 
imum acceptable subsistence wage. But it would be theoretically possible 
for capitalist government to raise the demand for labor sufficiently by 
some combination of wage subsidies (to reduce the cost of labor to 
private employers) and public job provision by the government as 
employer of last resort. Both this and the Chinese method, however, calls 
for a state with both the power to mobilize resources on a large scale and 
an effective structure of public administration. And a considerable degree 
of influence by the masses on the national leadership would most proba- 
bly be required to make any kind of full employment strategy politically 
feasible. 
To raise the supply of labor without significantly raising its cost and 
lowering its quality would appear to call for the use of non-market con- 
trols and incentives. The success of the Chinese in this respect depended 
significantly on administrative control of labor allocation and on effec- 
tive public administration. Furthermore, the mass campaigns, large-scale 
work projects, and extra hours that were critical to increasing the supply 
of labor in China could not have been successfully promoted without the 
kind of ideological appeal to the masses and the organizational skills of 
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Communist  Party cadres that enabled China's political leadership to 
influence and involve people on a large scale. 
The use of alternative means of  work motivation involved major institu- 
tional and behavioral changes conceivable only in a system based on 
public ownership and control of the means of production. Collective gain 
incentives can be effective only where meaningful collective institutions 
exist in the first place; this calls for all of the political-economic condi- 
tions discussed earlier in the promotion of collective institutions and 
behavior. The successful use of non-material gain incentives requires in 
particular the identification of personal with societal interests; this is 
impossible to sustain for a long period of time unless the political leader- 
ship is oriented to the masses rather than identified with elites, and very 
difficult unless the political leadership can influence and involve people 
in a meaningful way. Finally, to the extent that individual material gain 
incentives are de-emphasized, wage differentials lose their allocative 
power and it becomes more likely - if not strictly necessary - that the 
labor market be subject to administrative controls. 
The promotion of mass-oriented human resource development was not 
so heavily dependent on China's political-economic system as the other 
elements of China's development strategy. This is because human resource 
development is largely undertaken in public institutions (e.g., the educa- 
tional system) no matter what the prevailing form of the basic economic 
institutions of a society. Thus one can conceive of a mass-oriented pat- 
tern of skill distribution in a system involving a major role for private 
enterprise and market price mechanisms. However, such a system would 
have to include a government with the power to mobilize resources on a 
substantial scale, so as to permit it to establish the necessary public 
institutions. Even more critical is that the class structure be sufficiently 
mass-oriented so as to prevent the demands of privileged elites (as con- 
sumers of services provided by skilled labor, or as acquirers of skills in 
the educational system) from fostering an elitist pattern of skill distribu- 
tion, 
The universal guarantee of  material securiO, required some but not all of 
the major political-economic features of contemporary China. A strong 
state with the power to mobilize resources on a large scale, with the ability 
to administer effectively an extensive distributional network, is clearly 
needed to distribute the benefits necessary to provide universal economic 
security. In addition, a significant amount of administrative control of 
resource allocation is likely to be necessary in a poor country to assure 
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that essential but relatively scarce consumer goods are distributed in 
adequate amounts to everyone rather than captured disproportionately 
by the relatively better-off classes using their purchasing power in con- 
sumer good markets. Public ownership of the means of production would 
not appear to be essential, although it could facilitate the raising of 
necessary resources by public authorities as compared with the alterna- 
tive of taxing private enterprise. Finally, the political leadership would 
have to be sufficiently mass-oriented so that elite classes could not pre- 
vent the substantial income redistribution implicit in a guarantee of an 
adequate real income floor to everyone within a relatively poor country. 
The restriction of luxury consumption was probably the element of Chi- 
nese development strategy least tightly linked to China's political-eco- 
nomic system. The one critical feature of China's system indispensible to 
the successful application of this element of strategy would appear to be 
a mass-oriented class structure, for the restriction of luxury consumption 
clearly reduces the privileges of the elite classes and would not be 
seriously pursued by an elite-oriented political leadership. In China the 
virtual elimination of luxury consumption was in fact accomplished large- 
ly by means of administrative controls on consumer good distribution 
and the development of publicly owned consumer goods industries. But 
with the requisite political will it would be quite possible for a govern- 
ment to curtail luxury consumption in private enterprise and market 
price mechanisms by the judicious use of taxes and tariffs, which would 
not place excessive demands on the structure of public administration. 
Only if the restriction of luxury consumption were to be carried to the 
point where it significantly reduced the individual material rewards avail- 
able to top-level executives, professionals, and administrators would it 
require a transformation of basic economic institutions so as to make use 
of alternative kinds of work incentives. 
The reduction of the social division of labor opposes a powerful tendency 
of a private enterprise market-oriented economy and is therefore hard to 
conceive of without public ownership of the means of production and a 
substantial degree of administrative control over the labor market. Only 
where private capitalist control of the workplace has been eliminated can 
one envisage significant alternation of individuals among mental and 
manual tasks and across very different kinds of productive activities. And 
only where the training and allocation of labor is systematically planned 
rather than being left to the push and pull of market wages can one 
expect significant diversification and occupational rotation among work- 
ers. Whenever considerable reliance is placed on administrative control 
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of allocational processes, an effective and extensive system of public 
administration also becomes essential to the success of the effort. And 
when the element of strategy calls for substantial change in patterns of 
behavior, as is clearly the case with reduction of the social division of 
labor, the ability of the political leadership to influence and to involve 
people becomes an essential political-economic requisite as well. Finally, 
the political feasibility of this element of strategy depends on the mass 
orientation of the class structure, for reducing the social division of labor 
undermines the privileged position of elites in the social order. 
The encouragement of economic diversification of  regions and localities 
clearly requires intervention by public authorities to counter the natural 
trend toward specialization that arises under laissez-faire capitalism. If 
private enterprise were left to itself, most major industries would be 
concentrated in areas where infrastructural facilities and other industries 
had already been developed the most fully; small-scale enterprises would 
often have a hard time competing with large firms and/or  plants, and 
rural areas would attract very little industrial activity. Even a social- 
ist economy might well develop along these lines if the primary concern 
of its leadership were to promote rapid industrialization in the short-run. 
Thus the features of China's political-economic system which were criti- 
cal to the success of regional and local diversification were not its basic 
economic insitutions of public ownership and administered resource allo- 
cation. What was most essential was a class structure with a rural orienta- 
tion and an effective and extensive system of public administration. A 
rural-oriented political leadership controlling an effective administrative 
apparatus might well be able to promote small-scale rural industrializa- 
tion even within a predominantly capitalist economy, relying primarily 
on tax and subsidy policies to steer private enterprise away from its 
natural tendency toward industrial concentration and regional specializa- 
tion. 
The promotion of rural-urban balance in the development process also 
clearly calls for a political-economic system in which rural classes have a 
great deal of influence, and it too requires forceful intervention by public 
authorities against a natural market bias - in this case, a bias in favor of 
urban areas because they are almost always more economically advanced 
than rural areas. All too often in third world nations - whether capitalist 
or socialist - government intervention serves to exacerbate rather than to 
mitigate urban-rural differentials. Under the appropriate political-eco- 
nomic conditions the typical bias of public expenditures and price poli- 
cies against rural areas could be overcome and possibly even turned in the 
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opposite direction. This much would not appear to require either public 
ownership of the means of production or administrative control of resource- 
allocation. However, movement toward a genuine balance between rural 
and urban areas - such that economic opportunities and social welfare 
are equalized - calls for more than a change in government expenditure 
and price policies; usually a long history of pro-urban bias and urban 
advantage has to be overcome. To accomplish this the Chinese had to 
resort to policies (such as the direct control of migration patterns) that go 
well beyond the scope of government intervention into a basically 
capitalist economy and depend on a substantial degree of govern- 
ment administrative control of the labor market. And to ensure that 
enforced migration from urban to rural areas does not lead to so much 
discontent as to undermine seriously worker motivation and productivity, 
the ability of the political leadership to influence and involve people 
positively in such programs becomes very important. It is difficult to 
conceive of this combination of political-economic conditions without a 
substantial degree of public ownership of the means of production as 
well. Thus full implementation of a strategy of rural-urban balance would 
appear to require most of the major features of China's political- 
economic system. 
To limit the role of  foreigners in a poor third world economy, in such a 
way as to promote rather than to retard long-run economic growth, the 
state must play a significant role. Not only must it formulate and imple- 
ment various policies designed to curb foreign involvement and influence 
- e.g., controlling carefully the inflow of imports, foreign capital and 
foreign technology, limiting external debt, regulating foreign travel - but 
it must also undertake positive policies to make the best use of limited 
foreign inputs and to promote the use of indigenous resources and 
activities as a substitute for foreign ones. Thus a pre-condition for a 
strategy to promote self-reliance at the national level is a strong 
government, capable of mobilizing indigenous resources on a large scale 
and allocating them so as to minimize dependence on foreigners. Such a 
strategy needs an effective system of public administration. 
Whether this element of China's development strategy required China's 
basic economic institutions and a mass-oriented class structure as well is 
debatable. In principle, an elite-oriented political leadership of a strong 
third world state could vigorously pursue nationalist policies within a 
capitalist economic environment to promote the interests of indigenous 
against foreign capitalists. In practice, however, capitalist economic 
institutions in the third world tend to be associated with a major foreign 
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influence in the economy, and indigenous elites are often closely linked 
with foreign elites, because foreigners have historically played a major 
role in the development of capitalism in the third world, and indigenous 
elites have often depended on foreign support to maintain their power. 22 
Thus it would appear unlikely that most third world nations would or 
could successfully limit the role of foreigners in the economy without first 
having established a substantial degree of public ownership of the means 
of production (if not also administrative control of resource allocation), 
and without a class structure oriented more to the masses than to elites. 
The Significance of the Geographical and Historical Context 
Neither political-economic systems nor development strategies emerge 
from a vacuum. Underlying both aspects of the Chinese experience dis- 
cussed in the preceding two sections are a geographical environment and 
an historical legacy that provided the context for the formulation and 
implementation of the Chinese development model. To assess the rele- 
vance of lessons from the Chinese experience for other third world 
nations, one must consider not only the extent to which the success of the 
Chinese strategy was rooted in the Chinese political-economic system, 
but also the way in which both the strategy and the system were linked to 
the underlying geographical and historical setting of modern China. In 
this section I will first identify some of the principal characteristics of 
China's geography and history, and then try to determine how signifi- 
cant a role they played in the success of the Chinese development 
experience. 23 
The first and most overwhelming geographic feature of modern China is 
its size. China is huge in both area and population; only two other 
nations have a larger surface area, and none has a higher population. 
Partly as a consequence of its large area, China is endowed with a consid- 
erable abundance and diversity of natural resources, and its high popu- 
lation contributes to a large internal market. Because much of the surface 
of China is mountainous or arid, the ratio of population to arable land 
is very high: the Chinese economy is decidedly land-scarce and labor- 
abundant. One final important feature of China's geographical environ- 
ment (in a broad sense) is the unusual degree of ethnological unity among 
its people; the dominant racial type, religious tradition, and written lan- 
guage is shared by close to 90% of the population. 
The historical legacy of any modern nation is so rich and varied that it is 
difficult to single out a few particular characteristics for special attention. 
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For the purposes of the analysis to follow, however, four elements of 
modern China's historical background seem most worthy of mention. 
The first is that the Chinese cultural heritage - including the values, 
attitudes, and behavior patterns of its people - was oriented to hard work 
in this life and in some ways favored cooperative over individualistic 
endeavor. Second, by the mid-twentieth century many Chinese had 
already had access to a practical education and had also had a substantial 
degree of experience with the administration of large and complex organ- 
izations. Although only a small elite received most of the education and 
undertook most of the administration, many more people did have some 
contact with (and developed some appreciation for) both activities. 
Third, China was spared the worst effects of the economic, political, and 
psychological onslaught of foreign domination. Imperialism - f i r s t  West- 
ern and later Japanese - was an important force in Chinese history, but 
foreign powers did not intervene so forcefully in China as to wreck the 
whole socioeconomic structure and reorganize it in their own interests (as 
European colonists did in many other parts of the third world). Finally, 
and most obviously, modern China experienced a social revolution in the 
fullest sense of the term. The triumph of the Chinese Communist  Party in 
1949 marked a complete break with the past: a redistribution of economic 
and political power from one set of classes to another that completely 
transformed the class structure. 
These major geographical and historical characteristics are as a group 
unique to China, although some of them are shared in varying degrees by 
other third world countries. No other third world nation is as large as 
China, but several have abundant  and diversified resources as well as 
large internal markets, many third-world economies are labor-abundant,  
and some third world societies are ethnologically homogeneous. Just how 
critical this unique combination of geographic and historical conditions 
have really been for the success of the Chinese experience remains now to 
be considered. China's great size was clearly helpful for the implementa- 
tion of a few of the elements of development strategy already discussed. 
The economic diversification of regions is easier to accomplish without 
loss of productive efficiency if the regions themselves have large internal 
markets, and limitations on the role of foreigners are more likely to succeed 
in promoting national economic self-reliance (in the sense of au tonomy 
as well as self-sufficiency) simultaneously with economic growth if a 
nation has a large internal market and a diversified endowment of natural 
resources. Indeed, the promotion of a high degree of national self- 
sufficiency makes little economic sense for a small nation, for the costs of 
producing many kinds of goods would far exceed the costs of trading for 
308 
them. Thus large size is probably helpful for promoting national 
economic autonomy (without sacrificing long-run growth), but it is surely 
essential for promoting national economic self-sufficiency. 
Large size is not an unmixed blessing, for it can make the application of 
some elements of China's development strategy more difficult. The larger 
the surface area of the country, the more difficult it is to establish trans- 
portation and communication networks, and the larger the population, 
the more difficult it is to carry out administrative, organizational, and 
inspirational tasks. This implies that all of the elements of strategy 
depending significantly on the role of the state and the effectiveness of the 
political leadership are handicapped by large size. Most especially, the 
ability to mount an effective and extensive system of public administra- 
tion, and the ability to influence and involve people on a wide scale, are 
rendered increasingly difficult the larger the size of the country; one or 
both of these two political-economic conditions were critical for the suc- 
cess of eight of the ten key elements of China's strategy of development 
(all but mass-oriented human resource development and the restriction of 
luxury consumption). 
China's ability to overcome the handicap of size in developing a strong 
and effective state apparatus can be attributed in part to its high degree of 
ethnological unity. This relative unity - which extends from race to reli- 
gion to written language and to many other elements of culture - makes it 
easier for the political leadership to maintain contact with all the people 
and to gain their respect and cooperation. It is especially important in 
promoting the identification of personal with societal interests, which is 
crucial for the success of non-material means of work motivation. By 
contrast, the many third world nations characterized by sharp ethnologi- 
cal cleavages face a much more difficult task in building a strong state 
whose legitimacy and power is widely respected. 
The abundance of labor relative to land would appear to pose more of an 
obstacle than an aid to the execution of Chinese development strategy. To 
be sure, the abundance of labor does assure a high payoff to any strategy 
that succeeds in maximizing the use and effectiveness of labor as a produc- 
tive resource. But it renders all the more difficult the generation of suffici- 
ent employment opportunities for every able-bodied person. Further- 
more, the relative scarcity of arable land implies that agricultural output 
per acre must have already reached a fairly high level (to feed the popula- 
tion), which in turn implies that there remain few easy methods of 
increasing agricultural output (e.g., by bringing new land under cultiva- 
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tion). Instead, increases in agricultural output are heavily dependent on 
institutional and /or  technological changes that can raise the productivity 
of the available cropped acreage. 
While the geographic setting of modern China offered a mixture of 
advantages and disadvantages for the successful application of Chinese 
development strategy, China's historical background was more unambi- 
guously favorable. A cultural tradition that tends to value cooperation in 
fulfilling social responsibilities more than competition in achieving indi- 
vidual objectives is clearly conducive to the success of those elements of 
development strategy relying on collective modes of operation notably, 
the promotion of collective institutions and behavior patterns, and the 
use of alternative means of work motivation. China's cultural tradition 
may also have aided the process of labor input maximization by 
facilitating the successful organization of large public works projects and 
mass work campaigns. China's heritage of educational and administrative 
experience no doubt contributed in some degree to the successful 
establishment of those basic economic institutions - public ownership of 
the means of production and administrative control of resource allocation 
- that depend for their success on the compentence of public authorities. 24 
This heritage must also have helped in the development of a strong state 
apparatus in general, and an effective administrative system in particular. 
One or more of these features of China's political-economic system were 
shown to be essential for the successful implementation of each of the ten 
key elements of China's strategy of development. A third world nation 
whose people had little educational or administrative experience to draw 
upon could eventually develop the requisite abilities, but it would be 
difficult for some time to make a success of any element of the Chinese 
strategy of development. 
The fact that China had not been completely overwhelmed by Western 
imperialism by the mid-twentieth century had several important implica- 
tions for the development potential of the society. First, most of the 
agrarian sector of the economy was still oriented to production for local 
needs rather than production of cash crops for export, and the domina- 
tion of rural areas by urban interests was limited. Second, the individual- 
istic and consumeristic ethos of modern capitalism had not pervaded the 
whole society: its impact was confined largely to certain urban and coast- 
al areas. Third, the psychological state of self-doubt and exaggerated 
dependence on the foreigner, often induced by protracted periods of 
foreign rule and dominat ions 5 was not widely imparted to the Chinese 
people. As a consequence, several elements of the Chinese strategy of 
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development were rendered more effective. The promotion of regional 
and local diversification as well as rural-urban balance did not have to 
compensate for a protracted period of extreme specialization and urban 
domination. The promotion of collective institutions and behavior pat- 
terns as well as non-individual-material-gain incentives did not have to 
overcome a pronounced and widespread individualism. The restriction of 
luxury consumption did not have to contend with widespread emulation 
of more affluent foreign living standards. And the limitation of the role of 
foreigners could draw on indigenous price and self-confidence rather 
than foundering on misplaced deference to foreign skills and techniques. 
The final critical element in China's historical background was the Com- 
munist Revolution itself. Needless to say, this profound social revolution 
was indispensable for the overthrow of the elite classes of the ancien 
regime, and it was directly responsible for generating a mass-oriented and 
rural-oriented class structure in post-revolutionary China. The extent to 
which the revolutionary movement (over a period of several decades) had 
been rooted in the masses in general, and the rural poor in particular, 
cannot be over-emphasized. For it is this mass and rural basis of the 
Chinese revolution that conditioned the orientation of the political lead- 
ership and molded the distinctive character of the Chinese class struc- 
ture after 1949, and it also contributed significantly to the subsequent 
ability of the Chinese political leadership to influence and involve people 
on a wide scale in all kinds of development activities. Thus the revolution 
was directly responsible for three critical features of the Chinese political- 
economic system. At least one of the three is essential for each of the ten 
key elements of China's development strategy, and all three contributed 
significantly to the environment in which China's political-system could 
be constructed. Theoretically, a mass-oriented and a rural-oriented politi- 
cal leadership could arise through evolutionary rather than revolutionary 
processes, and political leaders could develop means of influencing and 
involving people without the common experience of a revolutionary 
struggle. A long world history of fierce resistance by privileged classes to 
any substantial diminution of their power, however, suggests that an 
evolutionary transformation of class structure must be the exception 
rather than the rule. 
Conclusion 
If the ten elements of Chinese development strategy discussed earlier are 
to provide object lessons relevant for other third world nations, they must 
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be potentially transferable to other societies. The extent to which each 
element of the strategy is transferable depends on the conditions under 
which it can be successfully implemented, and on the degree to which 
these conditions are satisfied in other third world nations. I had also 
sought to determine what political-economic, geographical, and historical 
conditions are required for the successful implementation of each of the 
ten elements of strategy. The results of this analysis are summarized in 
the form of a matrix in Table 1. Each of the ten elements of strategy 
under discussion requires at least one - and often many more - of the 
major features of China's political-economic system. In all cases an 
effective and extensive system of public administration and /o r  a mass- 
oriented class structure are required, and in most cases a considerable 
degree of public ownership of the means of production and administrative 
control of resource allocation is either necessary or helpful. Less often 
required, but crucial in a few cases, are a central government with the 
power to mobilize resources on a large scale, a political leadership 
capable of influencing and involving people on a wide scale, and a rural- 
oriented class structure. 
Among the key geographic characteristics considered, large size is neces- 
sary or helpful for the successful implementation of two of the ten ele- 
ments of strategy, but is disadvantageous in many cases because it is then 
more difficult for the political leadership to establish an effective system 
of public administration and to influence and involve people on a wide 
scale. An abundance of labor and scarcity of land is quite generally 
disadvantageous because it makes the achievement of rapid economic 
growth more difficult under any development strategy. But ethnological 
unity can be very helpful for the establishment of a strong state in all 
three respects I have distinguished. 
A cultural tradition oriented to cooperative work is quite helpful - if not 
strictly necessary - for three of the elements of strategy. A heritage of 
educational and administrative experience is helpful - but not absolutely 
essential - for all ten elements, since it improves the operation of those 
basic economic institutions and those characteristics of the state which 
have played an important role in the success of the Chinese development 
strategy. The less a society has been subject to foreign domination, the 
more its environment is likely to be conducive to the success of many 
elements of the Chinese strategy. And, finally, a profound social revolu- 
tion would appear to be necessary in most instances for the development 
of three features of the Chinese political-economic system which as a 
group are indispensable for the success of all ten elements of the Chinese 
development strategy. 
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These conclusions suggest that most of the elements of strategy described 
are currently applicable in only a few third world nations at best. Only a 
handful of nations have experienced a social revolution of any kind, and 
not all of these revolutions have been strongly rooted in the rural masses. 
Moreover, many of the revolutionary societies (e.g., Cuba, Mozambique, 
Vietnam) have a bitter history of Western imperialist domination to 
overcome, and most have only a limited heritage of educational and 
administrative experience to draw upon (e.g., the African nations). Some 
do not have a cultural tradition conducive to collective modes of opera- 
tion (most notably Cuba), and many are ethnologically heterogeneous 
(e.g., Angola, Mozambique). Of all contemporary third world nations, 
North Korea would appear to come closest to meeting the historical, 
geographical, and political-economic conditions that have played a sig- 
nificant (and in many cases an essential) role in the success of the Chinese 
development strategy. But even in the case of North Korea the match is 
far from perfect in many respects. 
Do these observations imply that the Chinese experience is essentially 
unique and therefore largely irrelevant for the rest of the third world? I 
think not. First of all, the Chinese experience has set new and higher 
standards for the evaluation of development performance and policy 
throughout the world: it is no longer enough to promote rapid economic 
growth, but development planners can and will be held accountable for 
achieving a balanced pattern of development in which non-growth objec- 
tives such as greater equity and self-reliance are promoted along with 
faster growth. 
Second, certain elements of the Chinese development strategy do lend 
themselves to successful application - at least to a certain extent - in 
other societies which differ considerably from China in their political- 
economic, geographical, and historical conditions. For example, the pro- 
motion of mass-oriented human resource development could be carried 
out with some success in a nation with a reasonably strong state (in terms 
of its capacity for resource mobilization and public administration) and a 
political leadership somewhat oriented to the masses. A strategy of re- 
striction of luxury consumption is potentially more widely transferable, 
for it requires mainly a mass-oriented political leadership and, up to a 
point, does not depend on an unusually effective state apparatus. Some 
degree of economic diversification of regions and localities, as well as 
some degree of amelioration of rural-urban imbalance, can be success- 
fully accomplished provided that the political leadership is sufficiently 
rural-oriented and can rely upon an effective and extensive administra- 
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tive system. In all these cases the necessary configuration of political-eco- 
nomic conditions is possible (if not very likely) in a society that has not 
undergone a profound social revolution and that operates within a pre- 
dominantly capitalist institutional framework. More revolutionary change 
would be more conducive to success, but not absolutely essential for 
some progress to be made. 
Third, and more important, some of the key conditions required for the 
successful implementation of much of the Chinese development strategy 
can be realized in the future even if they do not obtain at present in most 
third world societies. Here it is important to distinguish between those 
aspects of the setting of any given society which are virtually immutable 
and those aspects which are amenable to change under appropriate his- 
torical circumstances. The key geographical characteristics that I have 
discussed clearly involve stable features of a society's environment; 
nothing short of massive territorial annexation, massive migration, or 
genocide could alter the size, the resource endowment, or the ethnologi- 
cal structure of contemporary third world nations. The historical charac- 
teristics I have cited vary considerably in their susceptibility to change. 
Cultural traditions built up over centuries (and in some cases millenia) 
cannot be transformed within a generation. The amount of time it takes 
to overcome the effects of Western imperialism depends of course on the 
force and the longevity of its imposition, but in many areas at ' least a 
generation might be needed. And a substantial degree of educational and 
administrative experience can only be built up with several decades of 
concerted effort. The possibility of significant change in any of these 
three historical characteristics hinges on some kind of decisive break with 
the past which ushers in new political leadership determined to bring 
about large-scale change. Such a decisive break need not involve a revolu- 
tionary redistribution of power from dominating to oppressed classes, 
but it does require at least the accession to power of strongly nationalist 
forces determined to "modernize" their country (i.e., to increase its 
resemblance to the powerful industrialized nations of the modern world). 
Social revolution 'is the most fundamental historical characteristic of all, 
for it underlies the establishment of many of the key features of China's 
political-economic system and (not incidentally) also creates a context in 
which the needed changes in the other three historical characteristics 
become more readily achievable. Profound social revolutions, in which 
formerly oppressed classes do succeed in wresting power from formerly 
privileged classes, are not made overnight, but they can be brought about 
after a period of revolutionary organization and struggle. If the revolution- 
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ary movement is to be truly rooted in the masses (and the rural masses 
in particular), and if it is to succeed in a contemporary international 
context in which privileged classes in third world nations can often count 
on support from major foreign powers, it is bound to take a great deal of 
time and effort. But the point I am making here is that it has been done in 
some countries in the past, and there is every likelihood that it will 
eventually be done in some other countries in the future. 
At present it would be foolhardy to attempt to predict where Chinese-style 
revolutions might succeed in generating historical and political-economic 
conditions approximating those which have contributed to the success of 
the Chinese strategy of development. But there are many third world 
nations with one or more relevant geographic and historical characteris- 
tics already similar to China's. For example, India, Indonesia, and Brazil 
share China's large size, some of the Latin American nations are ethnolog- 
ically quite homogeneous, many East and Southeast Asian nations have 
cultural traditions resembling those of the Chinese, the people of India 
and some of the other semi-industrialized nations of the third world have 
already acquired a substantial degree of educational and administrative 
skills, and nations such as Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan were not 
thoroughly restructured by foreign powers. Profound social revolutions 
in any of these nations - however distant the prospect may now appear 
- would go a long way toward establishing the conditions under which 
many of the lessons from the Chinese strategy of development could 
indeed be successfully applied. As for the immediate future, there is little 
likelihood that the Chinese experience will be of much relevance to devel- 
opment planning in the rest of the third world. For the great majority of 
third world nations are still dominated by propertied or otherwise privi- 
leged elites, and, as one observer has put it, "revolution is precisely the 
fate which [they] are striving to avert through their development. ''26 
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I. Basic data on rates of economic growth in China since 1949 - on an aggregate, 
sectoral, and per capita basis - are presented by Arthur G. Ashbrook, Jr., in his 
contributions to the following two volumes: People's Republic o f  China: An Eco- 
nomic Assessment and China: A Reassessment o f  The Economy, published by the 
Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress in 1972 and 1975, respectively. Other 
articles in each of these volumes provide more detailed information on the perfor- 
mance of different sectors of the Chinese economy. For an excellent summary of 
China's overall economic performance under Mao Ze-dong, see also Suzanne Paine, 
"Development With Growth: A Quarter Century of Socialist Transformation in 
China," Economic and Political Weekly (Bombay, India), Vol. 11, Nos. 31 33 (Special 
Number, August 1976). Paine performs a valuable service by examining carefully alter- 
native estimates of China's economic growth and by exposing the downward bias that 
colors many Western appraisals of China's progress under Mao. 
2. For comparative figures on economic growth in the third world since 1950, see Tho- 
mas E. Weisskopf, "Imperialism and the Economic Development of the Third World," 
in R. Edwards, M. Reich, and T. Weisskopf, eds., The Capitalist System (Prentice- 
Hall: Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 2nd edition, 1978). 
3. A good summary of the evidence on trends in various dimensions of economic equity 
in China since the Revolution is provided by Paine, Part II; see also Alexander 
Eckstein, China's Economic Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1977), pp. 298-304. Nicholas Lardy, in his Economic Growth and Distribution in 
China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), chapter 5, provides especially 
useful information on the Chinese effort to alleviate urban/rural and inter-regional 
disparities in living standards. The critical distinction between inequalities in money 
income and the consequences of those inequalities for people's life styles is stressed by 
Martin Whyte, "Inequality and Stratification in China," The China Quarterly, No. 64 
(December 1975). 
4. For a discussion of evidence on unemployment in China (compared to India), see 
Thomas E. Weisskopf, "China and India: A Comparative Survey of Performance in 
Economic Development," Economic and Political Weekly (Bombay, India), Vol. 10, 
Nos. 5-7 (Annual Number, February 1975), section Ill. 
5. The extent to which China has achieved economic self-reliance at the national level is 
discussed in Alexander Eckstein, pp. 309-311, and Thomas E. Weisskopf, section IV. 
There is considerably less information available on self-reliance at the regional and 
local levels, but some relevant evidence is discussed in articles by Roll and Yeh, Lardy 
and Sigurdson in China: A Reassessment o f  the Economy. 
6. See Thomas E. Weisskopf, "Imperialism and the Economic Development of the Third 
World" and Michael P. Todaro, Economic Development in the Third WorM(London: 
Longman, 1977), chapter 2, for discussions of the evidence on this point. 
7. The picture I have drawn here of China's development achievements is somewhat at 
variance with a revisionist view now emerging in the United States, to the effect that 
under Mao's leadership the Chinese accomplished no more - and perhaps even rather 
less - than many nonsocialist third world countries in the same period. Setting aside 
such dubious popular sources as Time (which revealed its own political orientation in 
crowning Deng Xiao-ping its "Man of the Year" for 1978), the new revisionist view of 
Mao's China is perhaps best exemplified by a three-part article by Nick Eberstadt in 
the New York Review o f  Books (Volume 26, Nos. 5-7: April 5, 19, and May3, 1979), 
provocatively entitled "Has China Failed?" Much of Eberstadt's argument and docu- 
mentation recalls the list compiled by Paine, page 1363, for the benefit of "the incorri- 
gible China critic," of "short cuts which can be relied upon to produce the sort of im- 
plausibly low estimates of Chinese output which at times he seems to seek." Signifi- 
cantly, even after minimizing China's progress with respect to some important devel- 
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opment goals, Eberstadt concludes that "What seems certain, however, is that the num- 
ber of people at the margins of society fell dramatically in Maoist China. No other 
large country in the poor world not India, not Indonesia. Bangladesh, or Pakistan, not 
even oil-rich Nigeria or industrialized Brazil can say the same." It is perhaps no coinci- 
dence that the revisionist attempt to downgrade China's achievements under Mao 
comes at a time of political and economic rapprochement between the US government 
and business elite and Mao's successor regime in China both of whose interests are 
now well served by minimizing the success and rejecting some of the key policies of the 
strategy of development pursued in China under Mao's leadership. 
8. The ten elements of strategy that form the focus of this paper comprise what some 
observers have labelled the "Maoist" model as distinct from the "Soviet" model of 
socialist development strategy. Since 1949 the Chinese leadership has pursued policies 
associated with both of these models, sometimes following more of a Soviet path (in 
much of the 1950s) and sometimes following more of a Maoist path (in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s). The reason I have chosen to concentrate on the Maoist model here is 
that it appears (on theoretical grounds) to contain many more lessons than the Soviet 
model about how to promote multiple development objectives simultaneously. 
In keeping with its rejection of some key elements of the legacy of Mao, the Chinese 
political leadership in the post-Mao period has sought to discredit the Maoist model 
by arguing that it was detrimental to China's economic development. If this argument 
were correct, it would undermine my analysis of the lessons to be drawn from the 
Chinese strategy of development. In my view, however, the argument of the post-Mao 
leadership is highly suspect - in part because it reflects the typically exaggerated 
rhetoric of a high-level power struggle, and in part because it seems to be based on a 
redefinition of the term "economic development" to mean simply a very high rate of 
economic growth rather than substantial growth combined with significant progress 
toward other important development objectives. 
9. Rather than burden the paper with footnotes documenting each separate element of 
strategy described in this section, ! will cite here the main sources that I have relied 
upon for my whole discussion of the Chinese strategy of development: Stephen And- 
ors, China's Industrial Revolution: Politics, Planning and Management, 1949 to the 
Present (New York: Pantheon, 1977); Alexander Eckstein; John G. Gurley, China's 
Econom.l' and the Maoist Strategy (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976); Nicholas 
Lardy; Barry M. Richman, Industrial Societ.v in Communist China (New York: Ran- 
dom House, 1969); E. L. Wheelwright and Bruce McFarlane, The Chinese Road to 
Socialism (New York: Montly Review Press, 1970); and the two volumes published by 
the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, cited in footnote I. 
10. The possibilities for increasing productivity by increasing worker participation in 
decision-making are now gaining recognition in the Western world; see, for example, 
Paul Blumberg, Industrial Democrat1' (New York: Schocken, 1969). It should be 
noted, however, that this approach can place heavy demands on people's time in 
meetings and discussions; the "labor-intensive" character of worker participation, and 
its particular suitability to a labor-abundant economy like China's, have been under- 
lined by Donald Keesing,"Economic Lessons from China," Journal o f  Development 
Economics, Vol. 2, No. 1 (March 1975), p. 18. 
11. See Carl'Riskin, "Maoism and Motivation: Work Incentives in China," Bulletin oJ 
Concerned Asia Scholars, Vol. 5, No. I (July 1973), for a particularly insightful 
discussion of the potential for productivity gains in improved worker motivation and 
an analysis of the alternative kinds of work incentives utilized in China. 
12. This is the phrase used consistently by neoclassical economists to describe expendi- 
tures on education, health, etc., which tend to increase the productive and income-earn- 
ing capacities of individuals. 
13. For a graphic demonstration of this point, see Mahmood Mamdani, The Ml'th o f  
Population Control (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972). 
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14. This point has been stressed by Gunnar Myrdal; see his Asian Drama (New York: 
Pantheon, 1968), Volume !11, Appendix 2, section 21, pp. 1912-1919), for an instruc- 
tive discussion. 
15. This interesting and significant point has been made by Donald Keesing, p. 4. He 
compares the Chinese guarantee of material security on a societal level to an individual 
household's guarantee of security to each family member, and goes on to point out 
that "economists have recognized for some time that potential labor resources are 
more thoroughly u s e d . . ,  within an individual household (as in a family farm) than in 
a wage-paying enterprise bent on maximizing profits," for, unlike a family enterprise, 
"a capitalist enterprise has no incentive to use labor past the point where the marginal 
revenue product of the added work is at least equal to the wage; and the wage rate is 
unlikely to fall below the minimum needed for a subsistence income." 
16. For evidence on this point, see J. Land and R. Soligo, "Consumption Patterns, Factor 
Usage and the Distribution of Income: A Review of Some Findings," mimeo., Pro- 
gram of Development Studies (Rice University, Houston, Texas, 1974). 
17. Many of these benefits have been analyzed by Jon Sigurdson; see, for example, his 
paper on "Rural Industrialization in China: Approaches and Results," Worm Devel- 
opmen/. Vol. 3, Nos. 7 8 (July August, 1975). 
18. See Michael Lipton, Why Poor People Stay Poor (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Uni- 
versity Press, 1977), for a detailed discussion of the pro-urban bias in most third world 
countries and the consequences of this bias for economic performance. 
19. For a useful survey of the literature on the appropriate choice of techniques of produc- 
tion in poor countries, which stresses the importance of developing indigenous techno- 
logical capabilities, see R. B. Sutcliffe, Industry and Underdevelopment (London: 
Addison-Wesley, 1971), chapter 5. 
20. My characterization of the essential features of China's political-economic system 
draws on a variety of sources, including Alexander Eckstein; Jan S. Prybyla, The 
Political Economy of Communist China (Scranton: International Textbook Co., 
1970); and Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Ber- 
keley: University of California Press, 2nd edition, 1968). 
21. Political-economic conditions in many parts of the third world are described in 
Gunnar Myrdal, The Challenge of Worm Poverty (New York: Pantheon, 1970) and 
Charles K. Wilber, ed., The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment 
(New York: Random House, 1973). 
22. Samir Amin, Unequal Development (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976), analy- 
zes from a Marxist perspective the historical development of capitalism in the third 
world. 
23. My sources on the geographical and historical characteristics of the Chinese setting 
include Alexander Eckstein; Kenneth S. Latourette, China (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: 
Prentice-Hall, 1964); Dwight Perkins, ed., China's Modern Economy in Historical 
Perspective (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975); and Franz Schurmann. 
24. Dwight Perkins emphasizes this point in his essay, "The Central Features of China's 
Economic Development," in Robert F. Dernberger, ed., China's Development Experi- 
ence and the Other Developing Countries (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1979). 
25. The debilitating psychological effects of foreign domination are analyzed (from oppos- 
ing political perspectives) by O. Mannoni, Prospero and Ca#ban: The Psychology of 
Colonization (New York: Praeger, 1956) and Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks 
(New York: Grove Press, 1967). 
26. The quote is from Neville Maxwell, in his introduction to a special issue, entitled 
"China's Road to Development," of World Development, Vol. 3, Nos. 7-8(July-Au- 
gust 1975), p. 454. 
Theory and Society 9 (1980) 283-318 
9 Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, Amsterdam - Printed in the Netherlands. 
